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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of asymmetric information in the interbank
market and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetary
policy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfections
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1induce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two major
implications: ﬁrst, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to the
user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy (magnitude eﬀect)
and, second, it shows that banks’ liquidity positions condition their reaction to
monetary policy (Kashyap and Stein liquidity eﬀect).
JEL codes: E44, G21.
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The aim of this paper is to understand how ﬁnancial imperfections in the interbank mar-
ket aﬀect the monetary policy transmission mechanism and, more precisely, to explore
whether the structure of the banking system has any eﬀects beyond those of the classical
money channel.
There are two basic empirical motivations for our work. On the one hand, Kashyap
and Stein (2000) result, showing that the impact of monetary policy on a banks’ amount
of lending is stronger for banks with less liquid balance sheets, establishes the existence
of imperfections in the interbank market. Such a liquidity eﬀect is a challenge to the
theoretical modelling of monetary policy channels based on highly eﬃcient interbank
markets, an assumption justiﬁed by the large volumes of transactions and the particularly
low spreads observed on these markets.
On the other hand, the failure of existing theories of monetary transmission to explain
a number of empirical facts has also been a motivation for our work. Bernanke and
Gertler (1995) document that empirical research has been unsuccessful in identifying
a quantitatively important cost of capital eﬀect on private spending, which has been
labeled as the magnitude eﬀect, whereby the aggregate impact of monetary policy is
deemed excessively large, given the small elasticity of ﬁrms investment with respect to
their cost of capital.
In this paper we show that, once we allow for interbank market imperfections, not
only can we justify the Kashyap and Stein liquidity eﬀect, but a new framework of
analysis opens up, allowing for a better understanding of the magnitude eﬀect.
3The interbank market allows banks to cope with liquidity shocks by borrowing and
lending from their peers, a function that, as it is assumed in this paper, the access to
(inelastically supplied) deposits cannot fulﬁll. Our paper uncovers the important role
of the interbank market in an asymmetric information set-up by establishing the link
between the imperfect functioning of the interbank market and the existence of rationing
of banks and, in a cascading eﬀect, of ﬁrms in the credit market. Our modelling of this
eﬀect allows us to establish that the relevance of imperfections in the interbank market
for monetary policy depends on: (i) the dependence of ﬁrms on bank ﬁnance; (ii) the
extent of relationship lending, in the sense of ﬁrms having access to funds through a
unique bank; (iii) the heterogeneity of banks’ liquidity positions, resulting from Treasury
securities (T-Bills) holdings resulting from past decisions and liquidity shocks originated
in additional funding for existing projects.
The existence of credit rationing is of interest in our context because, traditionally,
the theory of credit rationing has been developed in a borrower-lender framework, better
suited to the theory of banking than to the analysis of the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy. In this paper we argue that credit rationing might also be an important
part of the transmission mechanism. Introducing interbank market imperfections in the
analysis of monetary policy seems a reasonable approach for two reasons. First, the
interbank market is the ﬁrst one to be exposed to the eﬀects of monetary policy in the
chain of eﬀects that will generate the full impact of monetary policy. Second, it is worth
considering an imperfect interbank market because Kashyap and Stein liquidity eﬀect
forces us to reconsider its supposedly perfect functioning and questions its purely passive
4role.
In order to analyze rigorously the eﬀects of interbank markets imperfections on mone-
tary transmission, we compare the transmission mechanism under two diﬀerent scenarios:
of symmetric and asymmetric information in the interbank market. The main lesson is
that, under asymmetric information, the interbank market is unable to eﬃciently channel
liquidity to solvent illiquid banks and, as a consequence, there is quantity rationing in the
bank loan market. The implications of credit rationing for monetary policy are straight-
forward. Under asymmetric information, monetary transmission may not be solely based
on the interest rate channel, but may also depend on a rationing channel. When the
Central Bank tightens its monetary policy, bank deposits decline and banks with less
liquid balance sheets are forced to cut down on their lending. Thus, in an asymmetric in-
formation framework, an eﬀect that cannot be accounted for in a symmetric information
framework occurs: the interest rate eﬀects combine with those of credit rationing and
reinforce one another. This combination explains why the eﬀect of a monetary policy
shock is larger than the one purely caused by interest rate movements, thus providing a
justiﬁcation for the magnitude eﬀect.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. As mentioned, our motivation
stems from a number of empirical ﬁndings resulting from the concern with the traditional
view of monetary policy, the money view, which explains the eﬀects of monetary policy
through the interest rate channel. Confronting this view, the broad credit channel, in
its diﬀerent variants (based either on the ﬁrms balance sheet and credit risk or on the
banks’ inability to extend credit) assigns a more pre-eminent role to banks and asserts
5that the supply of credit plays a key role on the impact of monetary policy. One of
its variants, the lending view, has focussed on the role of bank loans (Kashyap, Stein,
and Wilcox 1993, were the ﬁrst to clearly identify shifts in bank loan supply and to
show that there is indeed a bank lending channel). Complementing the criticism to the
interest rate channel, Mihov (2001) presents evidence that the banking system plays
an important role in the propagation of monetary policy. Namely, he shows that the
magnitude of monetary policy responses of aggregate output is larger for countries with
a higher ratio of corporate bank loans to total liabilities. Moreover, he uses measures of
banking industry health to conclude that the magnitude of monetary policy is larger for
countries with less healthy banking systems, that is, that are subject to higher levels of
ﬁnancial imperfection. These are issues that a rigorous modeling of the banking sector
should be able to clarify.
The lending view rests on the claim that there is a signiﬁcant departure from the
Modigliani-Miller Theorem for the banking ﬁrm, because ﬁnancial markets are character-
ized by asymmetric information. When the Central Bank tightens its monetary policy,
it forces banks to substitute away from reservable insured deposit ﬁnancing and towards
adverse-selection-prone forms of non-deposit ﬁnancing. This portfolio reallocation leads
banks to adjust their asset holdings and this leads to a shift in the bank loan supply
schedule, as argued by Stein (1998). Adopting such a perspective leads naturally to
a theory of the spread - augmented interest rate channel. Some authors have indeed
highlighted the inﬂuence of monetary innovations on the spread between the interest
rate on bank loans and the risk free rate to justify the relevance of banks for monetary
6policy (see Kashyap and Stein 1994, and Stein 1998). However, empirical research has
faced great diﬃculties in showing that a contractionary monetary policy will increase the
spread on bank loans. Berger and Udell (1992) document that, on the contrary, bank
loan rate premia over treasury rates of equal duration decrease substantially when Trea-
sury securities rates increase (and commitment loans do not explain this phenomenon),
contrarily to the theoretical prediction.
A second strand of the empirical literature on monetary policy that is directly rele-
vant for our analysis is concerned with the magnitude eﬀect. On the one hand, it has
been extensively reported that the response of business investment to the user cost of
capital tends to be unimportant relative to quantity variables, like ﬁnancial structure and
cash ﬂow. These variables have been included frequently as regressors in estimations,
and generally have proven signiﬁcant, suggesting that investment depends on variables
other than the user cost of capital.1 On the other hand, the empirical research on the
macroeconomic eﬀects of shifts in the interest rates controlled by the Central Bank shows
that the real economy is powerfully aﬀected by monetary policy innovations that induce
relatively small movements in policy rates. See Angeloni et al. (2002) for additional
empirical evidence on the magnitude eﬀect in Europe.
According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995), most monetary models predict that mone-
tary policy should have its strongest inﬂuence on short-term interest rates and a relatively
weaker impact on (real) long-term rates. Yet, the empirical evidence shows that the most
1See Hubbard (1998) and Schiantarelli (1995) for a review of this literature. Following the work by
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999), some authors have argued that investment cash ﬂow
sensitivity may not be always interpreted as revealing the existence of ﬁnancial constraints because
investment demand is diﬃcult to measure and may be positively correlated with cash ﬂow.
7rapid and strongest eﬀect of monetary policy is on residential investment. This ﬁnding
is surprising because residential investment is typically very long lived and therefore
should not be sensitive to short term interest rates. This result has been labeled as the
composition eﬀect and we also advance a possible explanation for such eﬀect.
Finally, our paper is related to the borrower-lender relationship under asymmetric
information and to the classical work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Still, we do not
consider second order stochastic dominance, so that our set-up is closer to Ackerloﬀ
(1970)’s market for lemons: once the interbank market is shown to be thin, in the sense
that only fully collateralized loans are made in equilibrium, liquidity short banks are
rationed and are forced to ration their clients.
The borrower-lender relationship under asymmetric information has been also ex-
plored in order to model interbank markets. Not surprisingly, many authors suggest
that the interbank markets deliver an eﬃcient allocation of bank reserves within the
banking system (see, e.g., Goodfriend and King 1988, and Schwartz 1992). This will
be the case if market participants are well informed to assess the solvency of any po-
tential borrower. Still, under asymmetric information, the interbank market may lead
to a second best allocation of liquidity as illustrated by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987),
Rochet and Tirole (1996), Flannery (1996) and Freixas and Holthausen (2005). The
empirical evidence tends to support the asymmetric information view of the market, as
shown by Furﬁne (2001), who presents evidence that some monitoring is done by lenders
in the interbank market, and Furﬁne (1999) and Cocco, Gomes, and Martins (2003),
who document the existence of relationship lending in the interbank market. Ashcraft
8and Bleakley (2006) collect both public and private information about bank loan portfo-
lio quality, and investigate how access to the federal funds market is aﬀected by adverse
changes in the measures of private and public information of loan portfolio quality. They
conﬁrm that the market responds to adverse changes in the public measures of loan port-
folio quality. In addition, they ﬁnd evidence that banks exploit adverse changes in the
private measure of loan portfolio quality by increasing demand in a fashion consistent
with moral hazard, increasing the frequency of borrowing and liquidity risk in response
to adverse private information.
The paper is organized as follows. We devote the next section to present the basic
model and assumptions. We proceed by comparing the equilibrium under perfect infor-
mation and asymmetric information. Section 6 evaluates the implications of our model
for the monetary transmission mechanism and is followed by a short conclusion.
2 The Model
This section presents a partial equilibrium model of the bank loan and interbank markets.
Firms face liquidity shocks and rely on bank credit to raise external ﬁnance. In this
way the ﬁrms’ shocks become a demand for credit and a liquidity shock for the banks.
As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Stein (1998), banks hold a large fraction of
their assets as reserves and liquid securities to act as a buﬀer against liquidity shocks.2
We assume that banks hold diﬀerent amounts of securities and face diﬀerent liquidity
2Models of how this buﬀer is build and how it is aﬀected by monetary policy were studied by Stein
(1998) and Van den Heuvel (2006).
9shocks. Owing to heterogeneity, there is a role for an interbank market to trade reserves
as in Battacharya and Gale (1987). We begin by developing a simple model in a perfect
information set-up, and then proceed to introduce asymmetric information on the banks’
liquidity shocks.
Following the literature on monetary macroeconomics, we adopt a highly stylized
view of how monetary authorities implement their policies. The Central Bank sets an
interest rate at which it is willing to borrow or lend unlimited amounts of collateralized
funds, with the collateral being liquid risk free assets as, for example, T-Bills. We call
this interest rate the policy rate and denote it by r, with r ≥ 0. We assume that
households and ﬁrms hold money in the form of bank deposits which earn zero interest
and provide payment services.3 The alternative to holding money is holding T-Bills. We
assume that arbitrage guarantees that the interest rate on treasuries equals r. Hence the
Central Bank, by controlling the interest rate, is able to aﬀect the opportunity cost of
holding deposits and we have a standard money demand which depends negatively on
the risk free rate.
2.1 Firms
There is a continuum of ﬁrms with unit mass and there are three dates. The sequence
of events and decisions, summarized in Table 1, is as follows. Each ﬁrm has a ﬁxed size
project requiring an investment of one unit at date zero. At date one, each ﬁrm suﬀers
3The zero interest rate on retail deposits would be obtained if banks beneﬁt from local monopoly
power, the supply of bank deposits is suﬃciently inelastic with respect to the deposit rate and interest
rates are restricted to be non-negative.
10Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
- Firms borrow 1 unit
from banks and estab-
lish a credit line for pe-
riod 1.
- The liquidity shock ν is realized.
- If the shock is below a cer-
tain threshold, then the ﬁrm
obtains additional ﬁnanc-
ing F with interest rate rF.
If the shock is above the threshold,
the bank takes over the ﬁrm.
- If the ﬁrm still oper-
ates, it generates output
Y and pays back to the
bank the amount R0 +
(1 + rF)F.
Table 1: Timing of decisions and events for the ﬁrm.
a real shock and needs an amount ν of funds. When ν < 0 the project generates a
revenue for the ﬁrm and when ν > 0 the ﬁrm experiences a cost overrun. For the sake of
simpliﬁcation, we also assume that ﬁrms can only be ﬁnanced by bank loans and that, if
the cost overrun is met, the project generates a certain return Y at date two; if it is not
funded, the project is terminated and has no residual value. We assume that the variable
ν is identically and independently distributed across ﬁrms with a uniform distribution
with support [ν,ν], ν ≤ 0, ν > 0 and ν+ν > 0. At date one, the ﬁrm obtains an amount
F of funds at an interest rate rF.
We are mainly concerned with the eﬀects occurring at date one, since it is at this point
in time when monetary policy will impact the banks and ﬁrms decisions. In particular,
we are interested in computing the ﬁrms’ optimal liquidation, their borrowing and the
interest rate sensitivity of their output.
Firms have a passive role as they are willing to borrow the amount of liquidity ν they
require to fund their cost overrun and, therefore, F = ν. At date zero, the ﬁrm asks
for a unit loan and promises to repay R0 < Y at date two if its project is successful. In
addition, the ﬁrm signs a credit line contract so that the interest rate on the date one
bank loan that the ﬁrm demands is not renegotiable.
11At date two, the proﬁt of the ﬁrm, under this contract, is equal to Y −R0−(1 + rF)ν.
A ﬁrm will default if and only if it cannot repay the bank at date two, that is, if the
output Y cannot cover the sum of the repayments R0+ (1 + rF)ν for the two loans the
ﬁrm has received. In other words, the ﬁrm will go bankrupt if its cost overrun ν is larger
than (Y − R0)/(1 + rF). If the ﬁrm is unable to repay R0 +(1 + rF)ν at date two, the
bank takes over the project at date one.4 Nevertheless, if the bank taking repossession
does not face ﬁnancial frictions, it may not liquidate the project of the ﬁrm. Instead it






An interesting feature of our model is that the ﬁrm does not wait until date two to
default.
Proposition 1 The ﬁrm will be able to ﬁnance its project if and only if ν ≤ ν∗ (rF) −
R0
1+rF ; otherwise the ﬁrm defaults and hands over its assets to the bank that will choose
whether to continue (if ν ≤ ν∗ (rF)) or liquidate (if ν > ν∗ (rF)) the ﬁrm’s project.
2.2 Banks
We assume the existence of a continuum of identical banks. At date zero, banks collect
an amount D0 from depositors, invest in illiquid loans (of size 1) that ﬁnance the ﬁrms’
investment projects and constitute a buﬀer of liquid securities (T-Bills) to face future
4Alternatively, it is possible to assume that the ﬁrm renegotiates its debt and the bank appropriates
the whole surplus.
12liquidity shocks.
The value of the liquid securities of a bank at date one equals B0 and we assume that
liquidity holdings are distributed heterogeneously.5 Speciﬁcally, we consider that the




and 0 < B < B.
The realizations of B0 are hard information, as they appear in the banks’ balance sheet,
and because of this, we assume that they are observable. We denote the mean and





B0. At date one, banks decide
how much they hold in liquid securities until date two and, after trading, each bank ends
up with an investment B1 in T-Bills that, at date two, yields (1 + r)B1, where r is the
return on T-Bills.
At date one the deposit base of the bank institution changes. We denote bank
deposits at date one by D1 (r) and we assume that dD1 (r)/dr < 0 . We represent the
incremental amount of deposits raised at date one, at the time new loans are made, by
D ≡ D(r) ≡ D1 (r) − D0.
Hence, the gross amount of liquidity held by the bank at date one is the sum of the
market value of its T-Bills plus the net increase in deposits, that is B0 + D.
At date one, banks inherit a unit amount of bank loans and make additional loans
equal to F (if projects do not default). For the sake of simplicity we assume that each
5The ﬁxed size of investment does not allow us to compute the banks optimal portfolio composition
at the initial date. We implicitly assume that the proﬁtability of bank loans is higher than the T-Bills
rate even after taking into account the impact of equilibrium credit rationing. Explicitly setting those
conditions would have obliged us to change our framework and assume a variable size project, so as to
allow for diversiﬁcation and compute the marginal eﬀects of investing in the two types of assets.
13bank lends funds to a set of ﬁrms with perfectly correlated projects. To all purposes
this set of ﬁrms is treated as a unique ﬁrm, so that there is a one to one correspondence
between the set of ﬁrms and the set of banks. Also, we assume a relationship banking
framework so that, on the one hand, a bank has perfect knowledge of the ﬁrm liquidity
shock ν, and on the other hand, a ﬁrm is captive from that bank and cannot switch
to another one. We justify these assumptions by referring to both theoretical models
and empirical evidence of relationship banking (See, e.g., Boot 2000, for the former and
Degryse and Ongena 2005, for the latter).
The diﬀerence between liquid assets and liquid liabilities at date one equals F −
(B0 + D) and will be covered through access to the unsecured interbank market. A
bank’s net borrowing in the interbank market at date one will be denoted by L (positive
or negative) and the corresponding interest rate by rL. This interest rate may incorporate
a risk premium because lenders in the interbank market are exposed to default risk.
Lenders in this market diversify their interbank loan portfolio and obtain an eﬀective





ρL if L < 0
rL if L ≥ 0
with rL ≥ ρL.
In order to avoid multiplicity of equilibria we assume that, when the cost of interbank
funds is equal to the return on treasuries, banks do not borrow in the interbank market
to invest in treasuries. Formally, we assume that LB1 ≤ 0 when rL = r.
The timing of the events for the bank is described in Table 2.
14Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
- The bank collects re-
tail deposits equal to
D0, lends 1 unit to the
ﬁrm and invests in secu-
rities.
- The securities held by the bank
are worth B0. A new amount of
deposits D1(r) is realized.
- The liquidity shock ν of the
ﬁrm is realized.
- If the shock is below a certain
threshold, the bank lends an amount
F to the ﬁrm at the interest rate rF.
- If the shock is above the threshold,
the bank takes over the ﬁrm and de-
cides whether to continue its project
or not. The bank does not continue
the project if the shock is above ν∗.
- If the bank has excess liquidity it
invests in securities or lends in the
interbank markets. Otherwise, it
borrows an amount L in the inter-
bank market at a rate rL.
- If the ﬁrm still op-
erates, the bank re-
ceives R0 + (1 + rF)F.
- If the bank is oper-
ating the project of the
ﬁrm, it receives Y .
Table 2: Timing of decisions and events for the bank under perfect information.
At date one the budget constraint of the bank yields
F + B1 = B0 + D + L. (1)
We focus on the interesting situation in which an interbank market develops. By this
we mean that some banks do not have enough liquidity to ﬁnance proﬁtable projects.
Assumption A1: (Liquidity needs)







We assume that the Central Bank does not set the interest rate r in such a way that
it generates a liquidity crisis at date one. By this we mean that aggregate liquidity is
15enough to serve the aggregate demand for bank deposits.
Assumption A2: (No liquidity crisis)
E [B0] + D ≥ 0.
2.3 The Firm - Bank Relationship
Recall that we are assuming that the bank has full information on the ﬁrm. We consider
the case in which, at date zero, the ﬁrm and the bank sign a credit line contract which
speciﬁes the terms of the loan at date zero and the interest rate at date one. We assume
that, at date zero, the market for bank loans is competitive and this implies that the bank
loan rate at date one is set as equal to the interbank rate (rF = rL). We assume that the
interest rate on the date one bank loan that the ﬁrm demands is not renegotiable. We
consider explicitly the possibility that an individual bank is rationed in the interbank
market and we allow for an upper bound equal to L on interbank borrowing. The proﬁt
function of the bank at date one depends on whether the ﬁrm defaults or not. When the
ﬁrm does not default, the problem of the bank is:
max{L,B1} R0 + (1 + rL)F + (1 + r)B1 − (1 + γ)L − D1 (r)
s.t. (1) and L ≤ L.
(2)
When the ﬁrm defaults, then the bank appropriates the project, adds the assets of the
ﬁrm to its own portfolio, and chooses whether to continue or liquidate the project. If the
bank prefers to continue, its problem resembles the individual ﬁrm’s problem in section
162.1:
max{L,B1} Y + (1 + r)B1 − (1 + γ)L − D1 (r)
s.t. B1 + ν = B0 + D + L
L ≤ L.
(3)
If instead the bank liquidates the project at date one, then it obtains no proﬁt from it
and gets
(1 + ρL)(B0 + D) − D1 (r) (4)
as a date two return from investing its liquidity.
Since there is perfect information inside the relationship, the ﬁnancial contract be-
tween the ﬁrm and the bank does not aﬀect the implementation of the project (this
being a weaker version of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, and assuming there is no cost
associated to handing over the project as in Diamond and Rajan 2001). Hence, our
model is robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the credit contract signed by the ﬁrm
and the bank, as for example considering an interest rate rF larger than rL. In the next
result we show that, in order to obtain the decisions related to the project, it suﬃces
to investigate the optimal decision taken by a single Integrated Entity which aggregates
the ﬁrm and the bank.6
Lemma 1 (Integrated Entity) The decisions regarding the defaulting threshold of the
6Our formulation regarding the liquidation technology available to the ﬁrm is more extreme than
it needs to be. For example, if we consider the model in which the Integrated Entity can liquidate a
fraction l of the projects and solves
max (1 − l)Y + (1 + r)B1 − (1 + γ)L − D1 (r)
s.t. B1 + (1 − l)ν = B0 + D + L and L ≤ L
then this model has qualitative results identical to the one we solve.
17projects, the amount of securities B1 and the amount of interbank loans L held by banks,
obtained by solving separately the problems of the ﬁrm and bank are equal to the ones
obtained by solving the problem of a single Integrated Entity which aggregates the ﬁrm






= Y − (1 + γ)[ν − B0 − D] − D1 (r)
while the proﬁt derived from non-continuation is given by expression (4).
We can also deﬁne the defaulting threshold of the new entity.




ν∗ (ρL) if ν ≤ B0 + D
ν∗ (rL) +
rL−ρL
1+rL (B0 + D) if ν > B0 + D.
Notice that an illiquid entity may have a tougher liquidation policy than a liquid
entity. As of now, we will (loosely) refer to the Integrated Entity as "bank".
3 Perfect Financial Markets
To close the model we study the interbank market. We analyze separately the cases of
perfect and imperfect information in the interbank market. In this section we consider
the case in which there is perfect information regarding the value of the cost overrun ν.
Hence every bank knows the value of the cost overrun suﬀered by the projects ﬁnanced
by its peers and only banks that fully repay their interbank loans obtain funds in the
18interbank market. Hence, at date one, there is no risk premium and ρL = rL. Provided
that there is no liquidity shortage, then rL equals the risk free rate r. Hence the defaulting
threshold equals ν∗ (r), the closure decision is eﬃcient and, as intuition suggests, it is
independent of the liquidity position (B0 + D) of an individual bank.7
The measure of projects that are liquidated is [ν − ν∗ (r)]/(ν − ν), while the measure
of those that continue (whether property of the initial owners or property of the bank if
they are unable to repay their debt) is [ν∗ (r) − ν]/(ν − ν). The aggregate output Y is







The semi-elasticity of aggregate output depends on the eﬀect of the interest rate on the
liquidation threshold. The higher the interest rate, the larger the number of ﬁrms that
will be cut out of funds and forced to liquidate.
Our goal is to verify the existence of a magnitude eﬀect. In order to measure the
impact of interest rates over output, we compute:
• The semi-elasticity of aggregate output produced by the total number of ﬁrms
with respect to the user cost of capital experienced by ﬁrms, which we denote by
εuc (rF).8 This semi-elasticity is obtained by aggregating the semi-elasticity of the
output produced by individual ﬁrms.
7When there is a liquidity shortage, there is a spread between the interbank and the policy rate,
which depends on the amount of liquidity available to the banking system. In this case, the defaulting
threshold equals ν∗ (rL) < ν∗ (r).
8The general formula for a semi-elasticity of variable Y with respect to ￿ r is ε(￿ r) = −dY/d￿ r ·1/Y. In
what follows, we assume that the bank loan interest rate, rF, is the sole determinant of the user cost of
capital.
19• The semi-elasticity of aggregate output with respect to the interest rate set by the
Central Bank r, which we denote by εr (r).
The value of εr (r) − εuc (rF) is a measure of the magnitude eﬀect so that this eﬀect
exists if and only if εr (r) > εuc (rF).
In the perfect markets case, the user cost of capital equals the riskless interest rate










ν∗ (r) − ν
.
Thus, monetary policy aﬀects aggregate output produced by ﬁrms through the interest
rate channel: larger interest rates shift the defaulting threshold ν∗ (r) and reduce the
measure of projects with positive net present value. This framework does not explain
the empirical facts because the magnitude eﬀect is nonexistent.
The outcome obtained under perfect markets contrasts sharply with the outcome
obtained under the extreme case in which there is no interbank market. Under the
latter case, a bank suﬀering a liquidity shock larger than its liquidity holdings is unable
to continue its projects and is forced into default. Hence, when no interbank funding
is available, liquidity holdings determine the continuation of a project. In this set-up,
monetary policy is important because it aﬀects the liquidity holdings of the banking
sector and interferes with continuation decisions. It is also worth pointing out that the
9Implicitly we are assuming that ﬁrms with a cost overrun ν ∈ ((Y − R0)/(1 + r),ν∗ (r)] are
restructured by the bank and continue. Hence their defaulting threshold equals ν∗ (r). Had we
assumed that the ﬁrm is terminated and the bank takes over the project and we would have
Y =1/(ν − ν) ·
￿ (Y −R0)/(1+r)
ν Y dν. The results that we obtain do not depend on this assumption.
20assumptions of inelastic deposit supply to banks and borrowing ﬁrms being captured by
the bank are necessary but not suﬃcient conditions for the existence of liquidity eﬀects
to occur. Under perfect markets, these assumptions do not prevent liquidity from being
channelled eﬃciently across banks, while they become relevant if the interbank market
is unable to perform an eﬃcient allocation of funds.
4 Asymmetric Information
In this section we assume the existence of asymmetric information on the ﬁrm’s cost
overrun ν. This cost overrun is known to the ﬁrm and its ﬁnancing bank that, because of
our assumption of relationship banking, has access to all relevant information. Obviously,
banks that have not established any relation with the ﬁrm, cannot observe the value taken
by ν, which is the source of asymmetric information.
The asymmetric information appears therefore in the interbank market in the con-
tractual relationship between a bank and its peers. We will assume that this asymmetry
allows insolvent banks to forbear and try to gamble for resurrection. Thus, as in Aghion,
Bolton, and Fries (1999) and Mitchell (2000) (where the accumulation of loan losses leads
the bank to hide them by renewing its bad loans in order to stay aﬂoat), accumulated
loan losses produce a cascading eﬀect here as well and triggers the bank’s gambling for
resurrection. In order to model gambling for resurrection in a simpliﬁed way, we assume
that bank managers have access to an alternative project at date one, which we refer
to as the private beneﬁts project, that yields, at date two, a pledgeable return K lower
21than Y, plus an amount of private beneﬁts equal to ϑL.10 In order to make the results on
aggregate output directly comparable with the symmetric information case, we consider
K as an asset and not as new production of the alternative project. We assume that
depositors are senior with respect to interbank lenders and that D1 (r) ≤ K, so that
deposits are riskless. We interpret K − D1 (r) as the bank’s collateral in the unsecured
interbank market, that is the recovery value of interbank loans given default.
The interpretation for the private beneﬁts project is akin to Calomiris and Kahn
(1991), in which managers have the opportunity to abscond with the funds and abscond-
ing is socially wasteful. We assume that 0 < ϑ < 2/3, which implies that, the larger the
amount of cash available to the bank manager, the larger its private beneﬁt.11 Also, the
existence of moral hazard in the interbank market is in line with the ﬁndings by Ashcraft
and Bleakley (2006).
Given an equilibrium in the interbank market characterized by a maximum amount
of loan ￿ L, a bank manager can always secure a loan of size ￿ L, so that the value ϑ￿ L is its
reservation utility level. Thus, after observing its project cost overrun ν, the bank will
compare its proﬁts level with the value of its private beneﬁts, ϑ￿ L, and choose whether
to continue the project or to engage in the private beneﬁts project. Obviously, since
this project yields K, any bank obtaining a loan with a repayment L(1+rL) larger than
K − D1 (r), and choosing the private beneﬁts project, will default. We refer to these
10Alternatively, it is possible, although analytically more involved, to assume that the ﬁnal outcome
Y is a random variable. This, jointly with limited liability, provides the option-like structure of stock-
holders’ proﬁts, which would obviously lead to the same results.
11When the variables Y and K are random, the assumption that private beneﬁts depend on the size
of the interbank loans is justiﬁed by the fact that, when a bank has a large amount of interbank loans,
it is more likely to be rescued either by the authorities or by its peers.
22banks as strategic defaulters. Remark, though, that the choice of strategical default is
endogenous and depends upon each bank’s liquidity position, given by ν, D and B0, as
well as on the interbank market interest rate rL.
Let ￿ L denote the present value of the banks’ collateral that can be appropriated by
the interbank lenders in case of default:
￿ L ≡
K − D1 (r)
1 + rL
.
Later we prove that rL = ρL, which means that we are discounting the value K −D1 (r)
using the risk free rate. Since a loan of size lower or equal to ￿ L is fully collateralized,
banks will always have access to such loans. Consequently, we denote the minimum
amount of liquidity the bank is guaranteed to have access to as:
￿ F ≡ B0 + D + ￿ L.
Notice that a bank’s liquidity position at date one depends upon the value for B0. This
value is obtained from the previous period decisions (regarding the amount of T-Bills)
as well as from the market (regarding T-Bills prices, if we had considered securities with
a maturity equal to two periods). The Central Bank can aﬀect the liquidity position of
banks by conditioning their access to deposits (which aﬀects the values for D and ￿ L)12
and inﬂuencing the interbank interest rate rL (which inﬂuences ￿ L). Table 3 describes
12In our simpliﬁed framework, the value for ￿ L would increase when interest rates increase. In a more
general framework, it is likely that the value of K depends on the stance of monetary policy, so that
the interbank market maximum exposure decreases, instead of increasing, with interest rates.
23Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
- The bank, but not its
peers, observes the liquidity
shock suﬀered by the ﬁrm.
- The bank chooses between
reﬁnancing, taking over the ﬁrm
or investing in the private beneﬁts
project (and liquidating the ﬁrm).
- A bank with suﬃcient liquidity
holdings lends in the interbank
market or invests in securities.
- If the bank has insuﬃ-
cient liquidity, it borrows
funds in the interbank market.
- The bank may be rationed in
the interbank market and forced
to invest in the private beneﬁts
project.
- If the bank chose the
private beneﬁts project,
it receives K which is
delivered to depositors
and interbank lenders.
The bank manager ap-
propriates ϑL.
Table 3: Timing of the extra decisions and events for the bank under asymmetric infor-
mation.
the extra events for the bank with respect to the perfect information case.
4.1 Contracts in the Interbank Market
We assume that banks compete in the interbank market. Because of asymmetric infor-
mation, competition will be in terms of the contracts (L,rL), since the proﬁtability of a
loan depends not only on its interest rate, rL, but also on the amount granted, L.
Market behavior is captured in the following two stage game:
1. In stage one, lending banks simultaneously announce a menu of contracts (L,rL(L))
to potential borrowers. Formally, this is deﬁned by the set:
Ω =
￿
(L,rL (L)) : L ∈ A ⊂ R
+,rL (L) : A → R
+￿
.
242. In stage two, the borrowing banks decide to accept or not one of the contracts
oﬀered by a speciﬁc bank. (For the sake of simplicity we suppose that, if they
are indiﬀerent among the contracts oﬀered by banks, then they randomize among
them).
A particular menu of contracts, the riskless competitive one, is particularly relevant
to characterize the interbank equilibrium. It is deﬁned as follows:








with rL = ρL
￿
.
Under some assumptions, the RCCM characterizes the unique equilibrium set of
contracts. This implies that, despite lending being unsecured, there are no risk spreads
in the interbank market.13
4.2 Equilibrium Set of Contracts
The reason why, under some conditions, the equilibrium is restricted to the RCCM
class of riskless, zero proﬁt contracts is quite intuitive. Agents with a low liquidity need
will always ask for a loan lower than ￿ L, which is riskless, and competition on any of
these contracts will lead to rL = ρL. Now, for contracts characterized by L > ￿ L, lenders
know that the behavior of strategic defaulters will be to ask for the largest possible loan.
13Yet, if the variable K were random, the concavity of the debt contract would yield a credit spread
for interbank loans.
25Because of this, any loan contract with ￿ L > ￿ L, will be dominated by a contract ￿ L − ε
as this slight reduction of the loan size attracts only non-defaulting banks, so that it is
always proﬁtable. The diﬃculty is then to see whether deviations from the equilibrium
associated with the RCCM are possible, in which case no equilibrium would exist.14 We
impose conditions such that no contract outside the RCCM class makes positive proﬁts.
The following assumptions allow us to focus on the case where a pure strategy equi-
librium with rationing in the interbank market exists. First, we disregard the case where
collateral is enough to guarantee a riskless interbank market, because this is equivalent
to reintroducing the perfect capital market we have already analyzed. This is why we
make the following assumption:
Assumption A3: (Rationing)
K + ϑ
K − D1 (r)
1 + r
< Y.
In the same vein, we also want to discard the uninteresting case where banks have
enough liquidity to cope with any type of cost overrun. Assumption A4 implies that, at
least for large cost overruns, banks will have to borrow from the interbank market.














14This non-existence may occur because banks compete both on prices and quantities, and changes in
quantities aﬀects credit risk. This is related to Stahl (1988) and Yannelle (1987) papers, where double
Bertrand competition may result in non-existence, and to Broecker (1990) where competition aﬀects
credit risk, leading to the non-existence of pure strategies equilibrium.
26Assumption A4 implies that ￿ F < min{ν,Y/(1 + r)} for all banks, which means that
it is more restrictive than assumption A1.


















D1 (r) − D0
￿
.
The intuition for this assumption is as follows. The term inside the brackets in left
hand side of the above expression can be rewritten as




+ E [B0 + D] − E
￿
B0 + D +
K − D1 (r)
1 + r
￿
which is the diﬀerence between what would be the "average" defaulting threshold without
rationing, that is
￿
Y − D1 (r) − ϑ￿ L
￿
/(1 + rL)+E [B0 + D], and the "average" default-
ing threshold with rationing, E
￿
B0 + D + ￿ L
￿
, when the interbank rate equals r. Thus,
the left hand side of the expression in assumption A5 is a measure of the ineﬃciency
caused by rationing, while the right hand side is a proxy for the size of the mass of de-
faulters. Hence, assumption A5 guarantees that: (i) the mass of defaulters is suﬃciently
large, so that lenders have no incentive to propose new contracts because the losses
associated to such contracts are larger than the potential gains; (ii) the ineﬃciencies
stemming from rationing and liquidation are not too large, as otherwise agents would
have strong incentives to propose deviating contracts.
Proposition 2 Under assumptions A2 to A5, the RCCM deﬁnes the unique equilibrium
27set of contracts that exists in the interbank market. The defaulting threshold for the
Integrated Entity with liquidity B0 + D equals ￿ F.
It may be argued, based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) argument, that credit lines
play a key role in our model and that, consequently, restricting the class of contracts
available to banks to pure interbank contracts is quite a restrictive assumption. We
argue that, in fact, allowing for credit lines, would not change the equilibrium. This is
the case because banks will compete on the terms (initial fee, amount of the loan and
interest rate) of their credit lines. Prima facie, it seems indeed that the existence of a
credit line, allowing participants to obtain loans from their peers equal to an amount
￿ L larger than ￿ L, would reduce the level of rationing and could improve eﬃciency. Yet,
such arrangement is vulnerable, ex post, to competition in the interbank market. Such
a credit line would entail ﬁnancing strategic defaulters and, therefore, the initial fee
plus the interest rate will have to cover the cost of these negative net present value
loans. Consequently, a competing bank could oﬀer a credit line with the same initial
fee and a loan slightly inferior to ￿ L at an interest rate substantially lower, as it will
not attract strategic defaulters. This strategy would separate all non-defaulting banks,
leaving strategic defaulters as the sole applicants to credit lines. Thus, competition
would reduce the amount of the credit line until the point where it will be identical to
the interbank loan itself and, hence, redundant.15
In the next section we characterize the equilibrium in the interbank market and we
15Consider the case in which banks have the possibility of extending irrevocable lines of credit at t = 0
to their peers, in an amount larger than ￿ L, that can be used to meet liquidity needs at date 1. Provided
that the value of ν is suﬃciently high, the mass of strategic defaulters imposes a burden on lenders such
that, at least for banks with low levels of liquidity, credit lines are not proﬁtable.
28restrict our attention to the case in which there is rationing.16 When this happens, on
the one hand, banks with (relatively) more liquid balance sheets are able to ﬁnance the
liquidity needs of their clients, and ﬁrms dependent on these banks obtain ﬁnance as
long as they have projects with positive net present value. On the other hand, illiquid
banks are unable to shield their loan portfolio. Firms captive of these banks are unable
to obtain ﬁnance because they are being rationed and this entails the liquidation of
proﬁtable projects.
5 Interbank Market Equilibrium and Monetary Pol-
icy
In order to study monetary transmission under asymmetric information in the interbank
market, we start by clarifying the equilibrium concept in our set-up.
The agents’ decision variables consist of their demand and supply of interbank loans
(L) and liquidity holdings (B1), and the equilibrium interest rate in the interbank market
(rL) is the one for which the aggregate excess demand for loans clears. Note that the
level of interest rates (r) is exogenously given.
In order to compute the equilibrium, we aggregate the individual net demands for
funds in the interbank market. We must have rL ≥ r, otherwise there is excess demand
in the market. When rL ≥ r, the individual net demand z for interbank funds by a bank
16In a dynamic model, we could think of several regimes where assumption A4 is relaxed, so that in
some regimes rationing is negligible as banks have enough liquidity, while in other regimes rationing is a
key characteristic of the interbank market. This would allow to understand the way interbank lending
may suddenly dry out. Because we want to illustrate rationing we will dispense with a multiregime
analysis and assume A4 holds in our static model.
29with cost ν and liquidity B0 is
z =

      
      
ν + B1 (B0,ν) − B0 − D if ν ≤ B0 + D
ν − B0 − D if B0 + D < ν ≤ ￿ F
￿ L if ν ≥ ￿ F
where B1 (B0,ν) denotes the holdings of treasuries, at the end of date one, by a bank
which inherits B0 and suﬀers a liquidity shock ν. When rL = r we have B1 (B0,ν) ∈
[0,∞) and when rL > r we have B1 (B0,ν) = 0 for all banks. The aggregate net demand
for funds in the interbank market, Z, is the sum of (positive and negative) individual
excess demands for loans.
Lemma 3 Under assumptions A2 to A5 and rL ≥ r, the aggregate net demand for funds
































ν B1 (B0,ν)dνdB0 ≥ 0, and the function Θ(rL) is de-
creasing in rL.
We distinguish two diﬀerent regimes on the basis of the existence or not of a spread
in the interbank market above the policy rate. This is of interest as we will show that
the eﬀects of monetary policy diﬀer in the two regimes.
30• An excess liquidity regime occurs if there is no spread in the interbank market,
that is rL = r. This will be the case if any bank holds a positive amount of T-Bills
in equilibrium, that is B1 (B0,ν) > 0.
• A liquidity shortage regime occurs if there is a positive spread between the inter-
bank market return rL and the target rate r, that is rL > r. In this case, it is not
proﬁtable for any bank to hold T-Bills, and B1 (B0,ν) = 0.
The two regimes can be distinguished according to the value taken by Θ(r), which
is a proxy for the value of the aggregate net demand for funds when B1 (B0,ν) = 0 for
all banks. If Θ(r) > 0, then the economy is in the liquidity shortage regime; if instead
Θ(r) ≤ 0, the economy is in the excess liquidity regime.
Lemma 3 allows to clarify the link between the amount of aggregate liquidity shocks
(i.e. cost overruns) and the liquidity regime. For the economy to be in the excess liquid-
ity regime, expression
￿
￿ L2 − 2[ν − (B0 + D)] ￿ L + [B0 + D − ν]
2
￿
must be positive on
average. This will be the case when (B0 + D), the liquidity position of banks is large,
so that the term [ν − (B0 + D)] is small, while the term [B0 + D − ν] is large. In other
terms, the occurrence of an excess liquidity regime, as well as the occurrence of a liq-
uidity shortage one, will depend upon the position of (B0 + D) within the [ν,ν] interval.
This is quite intuitive, as we have assumed a uniform distribution for ν, (B0 + D) rep-
resents the banks’ liquidity supply and the (feasible) liquidity demand is driven by the
extent of the liquidity shocks that are distributed in the [ν,ν]. Of course, the amount of
collateral determining ￿ L will also aﬀect the aggregate economic regime, as it determines
the maximum amount of a feasible interbank loan.
31Proposition 3 (Equilibrium in the Interbank Market) Under asymmetric information
and assumptions A2 to A5, there exists a unique equilibrium in the interbank market,
characterized by rL = ρL. In the excess liquidity regime, we obtain rL = r, while in the
liquidity shortage regime the interbank market rate is given by:
rL =
K − D1 (r)
(ν − E [B0] − D) −
￿




B0 + (E [B0] + D − ν)
2￿ − 1.
Market clearing pins down the interbank rate, which represents the opportunity cost
of funds for interbank lenders. As intuition suggests, the interbank rate equals r as long
as the liquidity available in the interbank market is large enough. Otherwise liquidity is
scarce and there is a spread between the interbank rate and the T-Bills rate that is purely
liquidity driven, as interbank loans are eﬀectively fully collateralized. The arbitrage
between the interbank market and the T-Bill market does not operate because T-Bills
are in the hands of consumers and not in those of the banks. The lack of liquidity that
creates the wedge between the T-Bills rate and the interbank rate has real implications
on ﬁrms’ access to credit, as the fringe of ﬁrms with a cost overrun ν in the interval
￿
￿ F(rL), ￿ F(r)
￿
will be liquidated.
Notice that, as intuition suggests, the spread increases when the demand for liquidity
increases, that is, for instance, when the value of collateral K − D1 (r) increases. More
interesting is the observation that a higher dispersion of T-Bills across banks, σB0, implies
a lower interbank market rate. This happens because a larger dispersion implies the
existence of both more agents with excess liquidity and more rationed agents, generating
32an aggregate liquidity supply.
It is useful to note that, in the liquidity excess case, ￿ F is independent of the interbank
market rate which is equal to the T-Bills rate so that, for any r, we have a corresponding
￿ F. In the liquidity shortage case, the values for ￿ F and rL are jointly determined in
equilibrium.
6 Implications Regarding the Main Empirical Facts
The object of this section is to analyze to what extent our results ﬁt in with the existing
empirical ﬁndings.
6.1 Two Empirical Eﬀects
In order to evaluate the eﬀects of monetary policy we assess the eﬀects of a shift in the
policy rate r. Recall that rF = rL = ρL.
Proposition 4 (Magnitude Eﬀect) Under asymmetric information and assumptions A2
to A5, the aggregate eﬀect of an interest rate shock is larger than the aggregate of indi-
vidual eﬀects of an increase in the user cost of capital.
The magnitude eﬀect is positive because εr (r) > 0 while εuc (rF) = 0. The semi-
elasticity with respect to the user cost of capital is null because rationed ﬁrms are insen-
sitive to the user cost of capital (while, in the perfect markets case, the continuation of a
project is mainly determined by the interest rate on bank credit). In our framework, the
magnitude eﬀect hinges on the fact that the banking system (and not ﬁrms) determines
33endogenously the marginal projects that are undertaken in the economy. Firms take the
threshold ￿ F as exogenous and, because of asymmetric information, projects with cost
overruns above ￿ F are liquidated. Consequently, for these projects, the opportunity cost
of funds is not rF = rL, but the shadow price of the credit constraint.
Recall that the defaulting threshold, for a rationed entity holding an amount B0
in securities, equals ￿ F = B0 + [D1 (r) − D0] + [K − D1 (r)]/(1 + rL). This threshold
reﬂects the availability of funds to the banking system and is inﬂuenced by monetary
policy through two channels: (i) the balance sheet channel because monetary policy
aﬀects the present value of collateral K − D1 (r); (ii) the deposit base of the banking
system D1 (r). Hence, when monetary policy is tightened, the value for ￿ F declines,
through the combination of these two eﬀects, making the credit rationing constraint
more severe with a higher number of projects being liquidated.
When there is a liquidity shortage, we must add, on top of the rationing channel, a
spread - augmented interest rate channel similar to the one described by Stein (1998).
Depending on the eﬀect of policy rates on the interbank rate spread, that is depending on
whether drL/dr is larger or inferior to one, the spread - augmented interest rate channel
can amplify or mitigate the rationing channel.
Notice that we proceed to compare, within a given set-up, the semi-elasticity of the
aggregate output with respect to the policy rate with the semi-elasticity with respect to
the user cost of capital. The result is that the magnitude eﬀect occurs as a consequence of
asymmetric information and the resulting rationing in the credit market. As established
in Section 3, no similarresult holds in a perfect information set-up. A completely diﬀerent
34exercise would be to compare the elasticities across diﬀerent set-ups. This would show
how asymmetric information increases the semi-elasticities of output with respect to
interest rates, but this would not be related in any way to the magnitude eﬀect.17
To conclude this section, it is worth exploring the connection between our theoretical
model and the empirical results obtained by Kashyap and Stein (2000). They document
that the impact of monetary policy on the lending behavior of banks is more pronounced
for banks with less liquid balance sheets, where liquidity is measured by the absolute
amount of liquid securities that the bank holds. Because of the construction of our
model, it is not surprising that we obtain a result with the same ﬂavour.
Proposition 5 (Kashyap and Stein Liquidity Eﬀect) Under asymmetric information
and assumptions A2 to A5, the impact of shifts in the interest rate r on the supply of
credit to ﬁrms is larger for banks with a smaller amount of T-Bills (B0).
Because our model is based on the existence of an imperfection in the interbank
market that prevents perfect circulation of reserves from one bank to another, the result
is not surprising. The previous proposition asserts the consistency of our framework
to cope with the issues documented by Kashyap and Stein (2000). Kashyap and Stein
(2000) argue that their result is entirely driven by the smaller banks, which are those
that are more aﬀected by asymmetric information problems. We do not explore the
diﬀerences in access to liquidity by large and small banks, because we assume that all
17The eﬀect would rather be connected with the ﬁnancial accelerator obtained in related models (see
Bernanke and Gertler 1989, 1990).
35banks have the same size. Note, however, that asymmetric information is the main factor
responsible for the results in proposition 5.
Our approach based on the existence of an imperfection in the interbank market seems
to be consistent with other empirical results. Indeed, if our framework is the correct one,
banks having access to sources of reserves other than the interbank market, such as an
internal capital market, should not react as much to shifts in interest rates. This is
conﬁrmed by the Ashcraft (2006)’s empirical analysis, who reports that loan growth of
banks aﬃliated with multi-bank holding companies is much less sensitive to changes in
the federal funds rate. Additionally, Ehrmann and Worms (2004) argue that the Kashyap
and Stein liquidity eﬀect does not hold for the German banking system because small
banks access the interbank market indirectly through the large head institutions of their
respective network organizations, and the interbank ﬂows within these networks allow
banks to insulate their loan portfolio from monetary shocks.
Our model allows for a discussion of the composition eﬀect.18 As it is, our model does
not distinguish between diﬀerent maturities in the portfolio of loans, as there is a unique
representative project facing a unique representative bank. Still, the extension to a well
diversiﬁed portfolio of loans is straightforward and, a bank without suﬃcient liquidity to
ﬁnance the cost overruns of its clients, will have to ration their clients regardless of the
maturity of their investments. Additionally, it is likely that long term interbank loans
are more severely aﬀected by asymmetric information and rationing problems. As long
18It has been suggested that this eﬀect is already well understood since, when the central bank raises
short-term rates, it is also signaling the stance of monetary policy in the medium-term, thus aﬀecting
medium-run investment decisions. Yet, in can be argued that the ability of the central bank to inﬂuence
long-term rates is negligible and, therefore, its decisions should have an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on residential
investment.
36as portfolio management strategies followed by banks prescribe matching the maturities
of their assets and liabilities, it is likely that the mechanisms described apply mainly to
long term lending and monetary policy aﬀects mostly bank loans with a larger maturity.
6.2 Financial Structure and Monetary Policy Transmission
Although our model is based on a number of restrictive assumptions, the main argument
is quite intuitive and it is expected to carry out in more general frameworks. The
rationing channel will aﬀect a larger number of ﬁrms, the larger the degree of asymmetric
information, the higher the interbank credit risk and the stronger the level of relationship
banking. To verify the possible empirical predictions, we associate these characteristics
of our model to variables that can be observed. We claim that asymmetric information
is related to a lower level of development for ﬁnancial markets and the importance of
small banks. Also, the existence of credit risk in the interbank market can be measured
by an index of bank health and the strong relationships that makes it too costly for
ﬁrms in our model to switch from one bank to another implies, by assumption, a strong
dependence on bank loans, which is related with the availability of alternative forms of
ﬁnance.
Although testing our predictions is outside the scope of our contribution, it is interest-
ing to relate our results with the ones obtained by Kashyap and Stein (1997), Cecchetti
(1999) and Mihov (2001) that make similar points. Cecchetti (1999) builds indices on
three key credit-channel factors, and uses these indices to build a summary statistic for
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Figure 1: Cumulative Deviation of Output from Trend and Predicted Eﬀectiveness of
Monetary Policy. Notes: “Predicted Eﬀectiveness of Monetary policy” is a summary statistic pro-
posed and discussed in Cecchetti (1999). See the details in Table 4. The “Cumulative Deviation of
Output from Trend” is the cumulative impulse response of output to a 100-basis-point increase in the
nominal interest rate from a vector autoregression containing output, price level and the short-term
interest rate reported in Mihov (2001). Data for the United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, United
States, Italy, Austria, Germany and Japan.
tic implies that larger values should be associated with more potent monetary policy, if
the lending channel is important. Following Mihov (2001), we relate these results with
the cumulative deviation of output from trend after a monetary policy shock. First, to
illustrate the possible role that ﬁnancial imperfection play in monetary policy, Figure 1
reports the relationship of the summary statistic proposed and discussed in Cecchetti
(1999) and the magnitude of monetary policy responses. Although based on a limited
number of observations, the diagram indicates a positive correlation. Second, Table 4
reports the Spearman’s rank-order correlation coeﬃcient for the relationship between
the eﬀects of monetary policy computed by Mihov (2001) and the indices presented by






















Table 4: Measures of association between cumulative impulse responses of output to
interest rate shocks and factors aﬀecting the strength of the monetary transmission
mechanism. Notes: The numbers in the brackets are exact or approximate p-values for the null hy-
pothesis that there is no correlation between cumulative impulse responses and the variables in each
column. "Importance of Small Banks" is based on "Banks per Million People", table 2 of Cecchetti
(1999). "Bank Health" is calculated using the "Average Thomson Rating", table 3 of Cecchetti (1999).
"Availability of Alternative Finance" is based on "Bank Loans as a Percentage of all Forms of Finance",
table 4 of Cecchetti (1999). "Predicted Eﬀectiveness of Monetary policy" is an average of the ranks
of "Importance of Small Banks", "Bank Health" and "Availability of Alternative Finance". The "Cu-
mulative Impulse Responses of Output to Interest Rate Shocks" is the cumulative response of impulse
response of output to a 100-basis-point increase in the nominal interest rate from a vector autoregression
containing output, price level and the short-term interest rate reported in Mihov (2001). Data for the
United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, United States, Italy, Austria, Germany and Japan.
Cecchetti (1999), including the summary statistic "Predicted Eﬀectiveness of Monetary
Policy". So, combining their results, we obtain some preliminary empirical results that,
we claim, provide support to the possibility of a rationing channel. Table 4 shows that,
although the variables "Bank Health" and "Importance of Small Banks" are not relevant
when taken in isolation, taken jointly with the variable "Availability of Alternative Fi-
nance", as we assume in our model and as reﬂected in the Cecchetti summary statistic,
does provide evidence in line with our conclusions. This is promising for further research.
7 Conclusion
This paper primary aim is to draw attention to the key role the interbank market plays in
the transmission of monetary policy. In our model, this role depends upon the existence
39of heterogeneous liquidity shocks for banks facing asymmetric information. In this way
we explain how ﬁnancial imperfections may account for some empirical facts regarding
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. First, asymmetric information in the
interbank market can generate rationing and helps justifying the liquidity eﬀect presented
by Kashyap and Stein (2000). Second, ﬁnancial imperfections justify the existence of a
magnitude eﬀect because rationing creates a wedge between the shadow price of funds
and the interest rate in the economy. Because banks themselves are rationed, there is
no interest rate the borrowing ﬁrms can oﬀer to entice banks into increasing their credit
supply. Consequently, these ﬁrms that are bound to be liquidated do not appear as part
of the demand for funds.
We have considered a very restrictive function explaining the behavior of retail de-
posits. Alternatively, we could think that the amount of retail deposits collected by an
individual bank is partially determined by the interest rate quoted by the bank. There
is no reason to think that our results would change signiﬁcantly if we allowed for this
possibility. The value of collateral, K, eﬀectively sets an upper bound for the overall
funding by the bank implying that a larger amount of deposits collected by a bank would
be exactly oﬀset by a corresponding decrease in interbank borrowing, so that banks will
not be interested in increasing deposit interest rates, as the elasticity is low and it implies
an equivalent decrease in interbank market funding. So, it will only be proﬁtable at the
margin to adjust deposit interest rates and increase the deposit supply.
Apart from considering explicitly short term and long term lending among banks,
our model is open to broader interpretations. It would be straightforward to extend our
40set-up to the case in which banks have access to alternative sources of ﬁnance, such as
certiﬁcates of deposit. In this case, the set-up in our model would be closely related
to Stein (1998)’s but, while he focuses on a separating equilibrium in the market for
unsecured forms of ﬁnance (highlighting the role of the spread - augmented interest rate
channel), we focus on a pooling equilibrium characterized by rationing.
Although we have focused on the rationing channel, our model can easily accommo-
date other channels. For example, when there is a shortage of liquidity in the interbank
market, equilibrium is characterized by a positive spread between the interbank market
and the T-Bills rate, and monetary policy has the ability to inﬂuence the size of the
spread. In this case, we obtain a channel very similar to Stein (1998). Finally, our
model has relevant empirical implications regarding future research on the determinants
of business investment and bank loan behavior.
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46A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let
Λ ≡ Λ(r,B0) ≡ B0 + D.
The proﬁt function of an entity that integrates the ﬁrm and the bank is obtained by
aggregating the proﬁts of the ﬁrm and bank and considering the restrictions of both
entities. The problem of the Integrated Entity is
max{L,B1} Y + (1 + r)B1 − (1 + γ)L − D1 (r)
s.t. B1 + ν = Λ + L
L ≤ L.
(6)
We compare the solution to problem (6) with the solutions obtained with independent
entities. There are two cases that we must consider.
In the ﬁrst case, ν ≤ min
￿
Λ + L,ν∗ (rL) − R0
1+rL
￿
and the ﬁrm borrows ν and does
not default. The proﬁt of the ﬁrm equals ΠF = Y −R0 −(1 + rL)ν and the bank solves
problem (2) with F = ν.
• If γ > r then B1 = 0 and, if the bank continues its activity, its proﬁt equals
ΠB = R0+(1 + γ)Λ−D1 (r) and it satisﬁes the loan demand by the ﬁrm and sets
L = ν − Λ ≤ L. If the bank strategically defaults, it obtains (1 + ρL)Λ − D1 (r).
Comparing both alternatives implies that the bank prefers to continue its activity
because R0 > 0.
47• If γ = r then B1 ≥ 0. Banks do not borrow interbank funds to invest in treasuries.
If the bank continues its activity, its proﬁt equals ΠB = R0 + (1 + γ)Λ − D1 (r)
and it satisﬁes the loan demand by the ﬁrm. The bank sets L = ν−Λ when ν ≥ Λ
or L = 0 and B1 = Λ − ν if Λ > ν. If the bank strategically defaults, it obtains
(1 + ρL)Λ − D1 (r). Comparing both alternatives implies that the bank prefers to
continue its activity because R0 > 0.
We compare these results with the ones obtained by solving the problem from the
Integrated Entity. If we solve problem (6), and take into account that the restriction
L ≤ L does not bind, the proﬁt from the Integrated Entity equals ΠF+ΠB which is larger
than the payoﬀ derived from strategic default. Hence the Integrated Entity continues
the project. It uses the same decision rules as individual banks regarding the amounts
of interbank loans L and treasuries B1.
In the second case ν > min
￿
Λ + L,ν∗ (rL) − R0
1+rL
￿
. The ﬁrm defaults and the bank
appropriates the project. In this case the proﬁt of the bank is given by the solution to
problem (3) which is the proﬁt of an Integrated Entity. ￿
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The proﬁt from continuation is πcont = Y − (1 + γ){ν − Λ} − D1 (r), while the proﬁt
from liquidation is πliq = (1 + ρL)Λ − D1 (r). The bank’s threshold will be the one for
which ∆π = πcont − πliq equals zero.
When ν ≤ Λ, then γ = ρL and ∆π = 0 implies Y = (1 − ρL)ν, so that the defaulting
threshold equals ν∗ (ρL).
48When ν > Λ, then the Integrated Entity is a borrower and the defaulting threshold
equals ν∗ (rL) +
rL−ρL
1+rL Λ . ￿
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We use the concept of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). We begin by the
last stage of the game.
Remark 1 Defaulting borrowers pool on the contract that grants the largest loan.
Remark 2 In every SPNE lenders must earn exactly zero expected proﬁts on every
equilibrium contract.
The former remark is obvious. Regarding the latter, note that the situation is akin
to the standard Bertrand competition situation so that, if a contract makes proﬁt, there
is an incentive for competitors to undercut the interest rates and obtain a larger share
of the market. Let
κ ≡ K − D1 (r).
Lemma 4 In any SPNE lenders must set rL = ρL and L ≤ ￿ L on every equilibrium
contract.
Proof. Suppose that there is an SPNE for which a measure of µ borrowers apply for
a loan L at a rate rL > ρL. Given remark 2 the expected proﬁts made on this contract
are null and two cases are possible:
• In the ﬁrst case, L > κ
1+ρL and there is a counterpart risk premium and some
non defaulters signing the contract pay a premium because of strategic defaulters
49buying the contract. Then one of the lenders can oﬀer a contract with a loan L−ε
and interest rate rL−ε￿, with 0 < ε < L− κ
1+ρL and 0 < ε￿ < rL−ρL, that attracts
all (nondefaulting) borrowers with κ
1+ρL < ν < L − ε. The proﬁts made on this
contract are positive since ρL < rL − ε￿. Hence ρL ≥ rL, but since ρL > rL is not
possible we must have rL = ρL.
• In the second case, L ≤ κ
1+ρL and there is no risk and remark 2 implies rL = ρL.
We now prove that the maximum loan available in the interbank market equals ￿ L.
To see this, suppose that the maximum loan was ￿ L, with ￿ L > ￿ L. Then it must be the
case that all strategic defaulters choose ￿ L. Given that rL = ρL then there is a lender
making losses in equilibrium and this contradicts remark 2: we must therefore have a
maximum loan ￿ L such that ￿ L ≤ ￿ L. But if ￿ L < ￿ L, then one of the lending banks can
earn positive proﬁts by oﬀering a contract with a loan L ∈
￿
￿ L, ￿ L
￿
with rL > ρL which
contradicts remark 2. Hence the maximum loan available in the interbank market equals
￿ L.
Lemma 5 Nondefaulting borrowers with ν − Λ ≤ ￿ L receive a loan equal to ν − Λ.
Proof. Obviously if a nondefaulting borrower was rationed, a deviating bank could
oﬀer her a loan and make positive proﬁts. The possibility of a borrower asking for a loan
larger than ν − Λ is ruled out by the assumption that agents do not borrow from the
interbank market to invest in T-Bills when r ≤ ρL.
Lemma 6 Defaulting borrowers sign a contract with a loan equal to ￿ L at an interest
rate rL = ρL.
50Proof. This result is implied by Lemma 4 and the assumption that ϑ > 0.
So far we have proved that the RCCM characterizes the only possible equilibrium.
We now prove that equilibrium is characterized by rationing. For this we use assumption
A3 to show that the defaulting threshold is determined by credit rationing.
Lemma 7 Under assumptions A2 to A3 the "strategic defaulting threshold" for an In-
tegrated Entity with available liquidity Λ = B0+D equals
Y −ϑ￿ L−D1(r)
1+rL +Λ, which satisﬁes
￿ F <
Y −ϑ￿ L−D1(r)
1+rL + Λ .





In order to ﬁnd the strategic defaulting threshold for the borrower we compute the value




= ϑ￿ L, which equals
Y −ϑ￿ L−D1(r)
1+rL + Λ. This is enough to





is decreasing in ν.
Recalling that κ
1+rL = ￿ L, because ρL ≥ r and ϑ > 0, assumption A3 implies that
κ + ϑ￿ L + D1 (r) < Y which is equivalent to ￿ L <
Y −ϑ￿ L−D1(r)
1+rL . This implies that ￿ F <
Y −ϑ￿ L−D1(r)
1+rL + Λ and, therefore, the defaulting threshold is equal to ￿ F.
Lemma 7 states that under assumptions A2 to A4 the interbank market rationing con-
straint becomes binding before the strategic default one does. Assumption A4 guarantees
that the minimum value for ￿ F is inferior to ν and that there is rationing. The ﬁnal step in





Lemma 8 Under assumptions A2 to A5 the RCCM deﬁnes the unique equilibrium set
of contracts that exists in the interbank market
51Proof. If an equilibrium exists, the above lemmas show that it has to share every
characteristic of the RCCM. So, in order to prove existence of the equilibrium we only
have to establish that no deviation from RCCM is proﬁtable.
The proof is obvious when we consider deviations where the amount of the loan
granted is lower than ￿ L. The proof for loans larger than ￿ L is more complex and requires
the use of assumption A5. We will show that a deviating bank cannot make positive
proﬁts by establishing that those proﬁts have a negative upper bound that we denote by
A.
A deviating bank oﬀering a loan of size ￿ L, with ￿ L > ￿ L, will attract a fraction of
rationed borrowers and all of the defaulting ones. Denote by ￿ F = Λ + ￿ L the new bound
on accessible bank liquidity when the new maximum interbank loan is ￿ L > ￿ L.
The proﬁt, denoted by Π, from oﬀering a contract ￿ L consists of the proﬁt made on
the nondefaulting borrowers minus the losses made on the defaulting ones. This has an
upper bound obtained by assuming that there are no defaulting borrowers with a cost
overrun ν in the interval
￿
￿ F, ￿ F
￿

















where ￿ rL (.) is a function of the size of the interbank loan.
Expression [￿ rL (ν − Λ) − rL][ν − Λ] is bounded above by the maximum proﬁt the
lender can obtain, that is, the one that leaves the borrower at its reservation level, ϑ￿ L.














dνdB0 denote the total
surplus generated by nondefaulting borrowers. Then the maximum gain for a lender, Π,














￿ F ϑ￿ LdνdB0.

















Replacing κ = (1 + rL) ￿ L, ￿ F = B0 + D + ￿ L, recalling that
￿ B







Y − (1 + rL)
￿ L + ￿ L
2
− D1 (r) − (1 + rL)ν+
(1 + rL)
￿











We will use assumption A5 to establish that A < 0. Since (￿ L−￿ L)(B−B)
ν−ν > 0 it is only
necessary to show that the expression inside the brackets is negative, that is:
Y − D1 (r) − ϑ￿ L + (1 + rL)
￿ L − ￿ L
2
≤ (1 + rL)(ν − E [B0] − D). (7)










B0 + D + κ
1+rL
￿
is decreasing in rL: It is easy to show
that the derivative of this expression with respect to rL equals −
￿

















≤ ν − E
￿





Using this expression, the deﬁnition for ￿ L and ϑ￿ L > ϑ￿ L, we obtain
Y − D1 (r) − ϑ￿ L +
Y − ϑ￿ L − D1 (r) − κ
2
≤ (1 + rL)(ν − (E [B0] + D)). (8)
Second, note that Lemma 7 establishes that banks with ν >
Y −ϑ￿ L−D1(r)
1+rL + Λ default
and, therefore, we know that lenders would only propose a value for ￿ L such that ￿ L ≤
Y −ϑ￿ L−D1(r)
1+rL . This result, together with (8), implies (7). Hence we have proved that A < 0
and that the proﬁt from a deviating strategy is negative.
￿
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
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Since ν > E [B0]+D+￿ L (due to assumption A4) and ￿ L = κ/(1 + rL), we obtain dΘ
drL < 0.
￿
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Notice, ﬁrst that no equilibrium is possible with rL < r, as this would generate a zero
supply and a positive demand in the interbank market.
Consider, next, the excess liquidity case, characterized by Θ(r) ≤ 0. In this case
an equilibrium exists with rL = r and we have B1 (B0,ν) ∈ [0,∞). The equilibrium is
unique, since rL > r would imply B1 (B0,ν) = 0 for all banks leading to an excess supply
in the interbank market.
To prove existence and uniqueness in the liquidity shortage regime, characterized by















B [Λ − ν]
2 dB0. Thus, there exists a value of ￿ rL for which Θ(￿ rL) < 0,
and by continuity, this implies the existence of an interbank interest rate rL, rL > r,
such that Θ(rL) = 0 The fact that Θ(.) is decreasing implies that the equilibrium is
unique.
We now compute the equilibrium interest rate in the liquidity shortage regime. After




















or, equivalently by introducing H = ￿ L + {D − ν} and C = −
￿ L2
























































B0 + E [B0]
2
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Hence, Θ(rL) = 0 is equivalent to
σ
2
B0 = −2HE [B0] + 2C − E [B0]
2 .
56Expression 2C = −￿ L2 + 2{ν − D} ￿ L − {D − ν}
2 can be rewritten after adding and
subtracting ν as
2C = −￿ L2 + 2{ν + [ν − ν] − D} ￿ L − {D − ν}
2
= −￿ L2 + 2{ν − D} ￿ L − {D − ν}
2 + 2(ν − ν) ￿ L =
= −
￿
￿ L + D − ν
￿2
+ 2(ν − ν) ￿ L = −H2 + 2(ν − ν) ￿ L.
Consequently, equilibrium is characterized, after replacing 2C and H, by the following
quadratic equation in ￿ L
σ
2
B0 = 2(ν − ν) ￿ L − (E [B0] + H)
2 = 2(ν − ν) ￿ L −
￿
￿ L + E [Λ] − ν
￿2
⇐⇒ −￿ L




B0 + (E [Λ] − ν)
2￿
= 0. (9)
Now, notice that for a liquidity shortage to occur, we require Θ(r) > 0, and, using the
same calculations, this is equivalent to having −￿ ￿ L
2
+2￿ ￿ L(ν − E [Λ])−
￿
σ2
B0 + (E [Λ] − ν)
2￿
>
0 where ￿ ￿ L is deﬁned as κ/(1 + r). In order for this quadratic expression to reach a
positive value, this implies that (9) must have two distinct roots ￿ L = (ν − E [Λ]) ±
￿




B0 + (E [Λ] − ν)
2￿
, one larger and one smaller than ￿ ￿ L. We can rule
out the root with the larger value, because ￿ ￿ L < ￿ L would imply rL < r. Replacing the
solution in ￿ L = κ/(1 + rL) yields the value of rL.
For the sake of completeness, note that




B0 + (E [Λ] − ν)
2￿
> 0 ⇔
⇔ (ν − ν)[ν + ν − 2(E [B0] + D)] > σ2
B0 ⇔ Θ(r) > 0




B0 + (E [Λ] − ν)
2￿
≤ 0 we are in the no liquidity shortage
57case. ￿
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Because, for each level of B0, the measure of ﬁrms that are not liquidated is ￿ F − ν,





ν Y dνdB0. When we compute εr (r), we take into










E [B0] + ￿ L + D − ν
.
Two cases are possible. First, in the excess liquidity regime, rL = r implying
drL
dr = 1.























This expression is positive because
dD1(r)





< 0. So, in both cases εr (r) > 0.
Firms take the defaulting threshold ￿ F as exogenous (that is, as a constant that does
not depend on rF) and, therefore, εuc (rF) = 0. The magnitude eﬀect, measured by
εr (r) − εuc (rF), is therefore positive. ￿
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
The supply of credit to ﬁrms oﬀered by banks with liquid assets equal to B0 can be





2(ν−ν). The semi-elasticity of the amount of bank



















￿ F 2 − ν2 > 0.















￿ F 2 + ν2
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dr > 0, which is what we wanted to demonstrate. ￿
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